El Salvador: A Central American Tiger? by Juan Carlos Hidalgo
El Salvador is becoming an economic success story inCentral America. Since the end of the civil conflict in1992, which left the country in ruins, El Salvador has
transformed its economy by implementing a far-reaching lib-
eralization process undertaken by democratic governments,
which has included the privatization of state enterprises,
deregulation, trade and financial liberalization, privatization
of the pension system, and the adoption of the U.S. dollar as
its official currency. According to the Fraser Institute’s Eco-
nomicFreedomof theWorldReport, El Salvador ranks among the
top 25 freest economies in the world.
The results of the market reforms are notable: between
1991 and 2007, the percentage of households below the
poverty line fell from 60 percent to 34.6 percent. However,
official figures point to mediocre average annual per capita
growth during the period 1992–2007—only 1.9 percent—
which is very similar to Latin America’s average of 1.6 per-
cent in the same period. But official figures grossly underes-
timate the performance of the economy because of flawed
measurement. In fact, the economy is probably more than
30 percent larger than indicated by the official data.
Accordingly, the average per capita growth rate since 1992
has been approximately 5.2 percent per year.
El Salvador still has much to do on its policy agenda. In
particular, high crime rates constitute amajor hindrance to
further growth. This lack of security represents the greatest
threat to sustained growth and liberal policies.
Nonetheless, the country is showing the rest of the
region how economic freedom can pave the way for devel-
opment and how globalization offers great opportunities
for developing countries that are willing to implement a
coherent set of mutually supportive market reforms.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Only 17 years ago, few imagined that El
Salvador could become an example of suc-
cessful economic development. Back then,
this small Central American country, com-
prising a mere 8,124 square miles—slightly
smaller thanMassachusetts—andwith a pop-
ulation of around 5.7million, was recovering
from a bloody civil war that claimed more
than 75,000 lives.
During the 1980s, El Salvador was a front
in the Cold War, with the United States back-
ing the government and the Soviet Union
backing the country’s Marxist guerrillas.
Urban fighting in the heart of the capital San
Salvador, murder of civilians by death squads,
and kidnappings and disappearances became
commonduring the decade. Povertyworsened
during that period, growing from 50 percent
of households in 1976 to 61 percent in 1988.1
During the years of conflict, economic pol-
icy in El Salvador was characterized by the
omnipresence of the government, which used
the civil war as a pretext to increase its control
over nearly all sectors of the nation’s econo-
my. The process was marked by corruption
and a stark decline in themain economic and
social indicators. Thus, from1978 to1992per
capita income in El Salvador declined by 24.1
percent (see Figure 1).2
Twelve years of civil war finally came to an
end in 1992with the signing of a peace agree-
ment between the government and the leftist
rebels. At that time, El Salvador’s economy
was in a precarious state, with the country’s
infrastructure in ruins, the majority of the
population mired in poverty, and hundreds
of thousands of Salvadorans leaving for the
United States to find work.3 Jump-starting
the Salvadoran economymade for a formida-
ble challenge.
Nevertheless, Salvadoran government offi-
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Figure 1
Per capita GDP 1978–1992 (constant 2005 $U.S., Purchasing Power Parity)
Source: World Bank,World Development Indicators, Washington.
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cials undertook an aggressive program of eco-
nomic liberalization that has transformed the
country’s economy and yielded major im-
provements in various socioeconomic areas.
Some of these market reforms—such as the
reprivatization of banks and the financial lib-
eralization of 1990—predate the 1992 peace
accord. Since the 1990s, this process has
picked up pace with further privatizations of
state enterprises, trade liberalization, pension
reform, and the adoption of the dollar as the
official currency.
The extent of El Salvador’s market re-
forms is reflected in the country’s rising
ranking in the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom of the World Report. In 1990, El
Salvador was ranked 84th in the world, with
a score of 4.81 out of a possible 10—yet by
2006, it ranked 25th out of 141 countries,
with a score of 7.51. This qualified it as the
third-freest economy in Latin America, after
Chile and Costa Rica.4
These economic reforms have had a pro-
found impact on the country’s leading social
indicators. According to the World Bank,
between1991and2002, “Netenrollment inpri-
mary education increased by close to 10 per-
centage points, infant mortality declined by 40
percent,populationwithoutaccess tosafewater
washalved and extremepovertywas reducedby
half.By2000,ElSalvadorwaswellpositionedto
meet most of the 2015 Millen-nium
Development Goals ahead of schedule.”5 In
1991, the percentage of households below the
poverty line was around 60 percent; by 2007,
that figure had fallen to 34.6 percent. During
the same period, the percentage of households
living in extreme poverty fell from 28.2 percent
to 10.8 percent.6
The improvement in average Salvadorans’
qualityof life ismostevident in thearrayofcon-
sumer goods available to the population today
compared to those available in 1992. For exam-
ple, the number of households with electricity,
refrigerators, and televisions increasedbynearly
20 percent during this period; meanwhile the
number of households using firewood for
cooking decreased by 24 percent (see Figure 2).
The fight against poverty would have
made even greater strides had nature not
dealt El Salvador some serious blows. In ear-
ly 2001, two powerful earthquakes affected
nearly 20 percent of the country’s popula-
tion, causing an estimated $1.6 billion in
damages—about 12 percent of theGDP.7 And
as if that were not enough, in 2005 El
Salvador was battered again, this time by
Hurricane Stan, which caused significant
human and material losses.
The Salvadoran people’s support for free-
market reforms was evident in the country’s
presidential election in March 2004, in which
the incumbent Alianza Republicana National-
ista (ARENA) party8 candidate, Antonio Saca,
won resoundingly with 57 percent of the vote.
Meanwhile, the candidate for the leftist Fara-
bundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
(FMLN),ShafikHandal—whohadcampaigned
onapromise to “dismantle theneoliberalmod-
el”—garnered amere 35 percent.
While El Salvador still has a long way to
go to be considered a developed nation, it has
taken important steps in the fight against
poverty—from which other countries with
similar circumstances can draw important
lessons.
The First Step:
Financial Deregulation
The reprivatization of the banking sector,
starting in 1990, launched the first round of
economic reforms during the administration
of President Alfredo Cristiani (1989–1994).
Salvadoran banks had been nationalized in
March 1980, at the start of the civil conflict.
While the authorities at the time justified this
move as a way to alleviate income inequality
and to expand access to credit, the real reasons
were political and military. The nationaliza-
tion of the banks resulted in a highly concen-
trated financial sector and a highly politicized
processof access to credit. The resultsweredis-
astrous: during 1979–1989, bank deposits
shrankby 26.3 percent andprivate sector cred-
it decreased by 43.6 percent.9 The armed con-
flict surely also contributed to the country’s
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economic contraction, but the deficiencies in
assigning loans were great: the banking sys-
tem’s bad debt stood at $434 million on
December 31, 1989, which constituted 37.4
percent of all loans.10
The 1990 reprivatization of the banking
system helped transform El Salvador’s finan-
cial sector. As a preliminary measure, prior to
transferring financial institutions to private
ownership, the government undertook a
process to fix the nation’s private credit, either
directly through infusions of capital or indi-
rectly through the purchase of bad loans. For
this purpose, a financial support and resolu-
tion fundwasestablished (FondodeSaneamiento
yFortalecimientoFinanciero), andwas capitalized
by commercial bank shares and contributions
from the government and the central bank.
The government proceeded to either stabilize
or liquidate thosebankswhose financial stabil-
ity was severely compromised, depending on
each institution’s circumstances.Followingthe
reinforcementof credit andtheprivatizationof
banks, interest rates for both loans and savings
were freely determined without interference
from the country’s monetary authorities, as
was the case with private lines of credit extend-
ed with private capital.
The early 1990s also saw the enactment of a
series of laws intended to establish a new regu-
latory framework for theentire financial sector,
including legislation regarding currency ex-
change, stock trading, the creation of a new
regulator (Superintendencia del Sector Financiero),
and establishing new functions for the central
bank (Banco Central de Reserva, or BCR). In this
regard, the central bank was barred from
financing the government or private enterpris-
es, either directly or indirectly.
The financial sector has grown since then,
with the emergence of a stock market in
1992, 15 brokerages, private pension fund
management firms, and the free entry and
exit of banking institutions. Currently, there
0
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Figure 2
Quality of Life Indicators 1992–2007 (percentage of households)
Source: General Office of Statistics and Census, Population and Housing Census of 1992 and 2007, San Salvador.
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are 10 banks and 5 nonbank brokers operat-
ing in El Salvador, as well as one foreign bank
with local branches. Under the 1999 banking
law and its subsequent amendments, foreign
banks enjoy the same treatment as their local
counterparts and can offer the same lines of
products and services. This has introduced a
level of financial competition that does not
exist inmost other Latin American countries.
Moreover, during 2005–2006, the country’s
four main banks—which are also among the
largest in Central America—were acquired by
major foreign financial institutions such as
HSBC, Bancolombia, andCitibank. Today, El
Salvador has the largest presence of foreign
banks in Central America, surpassing even
Panama.11
This liberalization process has increased
competition and efficiency in the financial
sector. In less than a decade, the nation’s
interest margin—that is, the difference in
interest rates between loans and savings—had
been cut from 17.8 percent at the beginning
of 1992 to 10 percent at the end of 2000.12
Private bank deposits recovered quickly. In
just four years (1994–1998) they increased by
70.2 percent, which demonstrates a great deal
of public confidence in the financial liberaliza-
tion. Similarly, commercial bank credit saw an
increase of 11.7 percent during the same peri-
od. Over 80 percent of credit during that time
was directed toward the private sector, with
bad loans accounting for less than5percent of
all credit—confirming the health of the sys-
tem.13 The Salvadoran financial sector’s net
assets increased from $1.88 billion in 1990 to
$6.88 billion a decade later—an increase of 266
percent, even though the number of banks
increased by only two during the period.14
While the peace accords played an important
role in the banking sector’s recovery, by all
accounts it has beenEl Salvador’s financial lib-
eralization that has helped to energize the
country’s economy.
Thanks to a more disciplined monetary
policy, and the consequent fall in inflation—
in addition to increased banking competi-
tion—interest rates on loans have gone down
considerably, a change later secured by dol-
larization in 2001 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Loan Interest Rates 1990–2008 (yearly average for short-term andmedium- to long-term loans)
Source: Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, San Salvador.
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Pension Privatization
El Salvador’s financial liberalization was
consolidated by the privatization of the
nation’s social security system, through the
implementation of a private accounts system
similar to that adopted in Chile in 1981. On
April 14, 1998, a newpension systembasedon
individual capitalization—part of the second
round of economic reforms—replaced the old
redistributionist public system. The public
pension system was experiencing insolvency
problems because of demographic changes
and the economic instability engendered by
the armed conflict. The strife of the 1980s
resulted in an expansion of the informal sec-
tor and slashed the value of reserves as a result
of high inflation.
Rather than experiment with schemes to
extend the life of the public pension system—
such as increasing either the retirement age
or individual contributions—Salvadoran
officials decided to emulate the private sys-
tem adopted by Chile 17 years earlier. The
new Salvadoran system is based on the fol-
lowing characteristics:
1. Individual capitalization. The system
consists of individual accounts that are
the property of each account holder,
who contributes 13 percent of his/her
salary to the account. These contribu-
tions and the profits they earnmake up
the savings of each individual worker
over the course of his/her career.
2. Private management. Worker contribu-
tions aremanaged by competing private
pension fund management firms,
which are entrusted with investing
those funds in the stock market under
strict regulations. The program began
operating with five management firms,
but that number has been reduced to
two today.
3. Freedom of choice. Workers may choose
their pension fund administrator, as well
as the terms of their own retirement.
4. Backup state subsidy. The government
guarantees a minimum pension to
those persons who have worked the
required time period yet have not man-
aged to accumulate sufficient funds to
cover their basic necessities in retire-
ment.
The transition to the new system was
accomplished as follows: All workers over 36
years old but younger than 55 (men) and 50
(women) were given the option of either stay-
ing with the old state pension system or tran-
sitioning to a personal private account. Those
workers either entering the labor force for the
first time or under 36 years old had their
retirement funds transferred to a private
account in a pension fund company of their
choice. Individuals over 50 (women) and 55
(men) remained enrolled in the old state sys-
tem. Those workers who were transferred to a
pension fund company were given a “certifi-
cate of transition” that documented the
amountofmoney that they contributed to the
state system during their working lives. In
order to pay the obligations under these cer-
tificates, the government established an amor-
tization fund that was financed by a combina-
tion of state pension system reserves and
contributions from the government’s general
budget. However, as the state pension reserves
havebecomeexhausted andexpenditureshave
increased because of the growing number of
retirees, the government has begun issuing
investment certificates, which are used to pay
the certificates of transition to the private pen-
sion fund companies.
The consolidation of domestic savings,
combined with an open financial system, can
help a small economy to better face the
vagaries of global investment flows. The accu-
mulation of these savings is a direct result of
adopting policies that encourage individual
capital accumulation.Thus, 10 years following
the adoptionof El Salvador’s pension reforms,
individual pension accounts represented 22.5
percent of the country’s GDP.15
Nevertheless, El Salvador’s private sector
has yet to take full advantage of this accumu-
lation of capital: as of March 2008, 79.1 per-
cent of private pension fund companies’
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investments were still in instruments issued
by public institutions. In part, this is a result
of the transition from the old public system
to the new private one, since the government
required the private pension fund companies
to purchase bonds to help the government
pay its own pension obligations. As the sys-
tem matures, the amount of funds invested
by the private pension funds in state instru-
ments should diminish gradually.
However, other factors have been cited as
contributing to this accumulation. Dani
Rodrik and Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard
University point to the lack of a high-risk
financial sector.16 A more plausible explana-
tionmay be the legal restrictions that prevent
private account managers from investing
heavily in domestic company shares offered
in the stock market. Under current legisla-
tion, private pension fund companies may
only acquire shares rated “A” by at least two
credit rating agencies. This drastically
reduces the size of themarket, since the num-
ber of shares that meet this requirement is
very small.
Another significant factor is the prohibi-
tion on private pension fund companies to
invest part of their assets outside the country.
This is in contrast to other Latin American
countries such as Chile and Peru, which allow
such investment. Ending this prohibition is
essential to reducing the amount of funds
invested in state financial instruments, which
threatens those instruments’ long-term viabil-
ity and runs counter to the fundamental prin-
ciple of risk diversification. For example, the
historical real return on pension funds is low,
with an annual average of only 4.7 percent
during 1999–2007.17 By comparison, during
the first nine years after Chile’s pension
reform, the return on that country’s pension
funds averaged 9.6 percent annually, and the
historic return since 1981 has averaged 8.9
percent per year.18
Despite these limitations, the adoption of a
privatepensionsystemhashadsignificant con-
sequences for El Salvador’s economy. First, it is
fixing the solvencyproblemsthat existedunder
the old system. Second, it fundamentally
changed themanagement of pension funds by
substituting a system that encouraged con-
sumptionwithone that encourages saving and
investment. Moreover, the private system
increased workers’ freedom to choose how,
with whom, and howmuch to invest; when to
access their money; and when to retire. This
may be themost important feature of a private
system, since it gives workers control over their
own futures—much to the detriment of the
political class, which, under the old system,
wouldmake retirement decisions for the coun-
try’s entire workforce. As of March 2008, the
number of persons who have signed up for the
private contribution system was 1,658,349—
which represents 87 percent of the country’s
active labormarket population.19
Finally, El Salvador’s pension reform com-
plemented the implementationof other policy
changes, such as trade liberalization. As José
Piñera, former labor minister in Chile and
architect of that country’s pension reform,
notes, “the investment of pension funds in the
market makes every worker a capitalist, one
who participates in an overt manner in an
economy that competes internationally. . . .
Free trade is good for the economy, and what
is good for the economy is good for in-
vestors.”20 Thus, El Salvador’s social security
privatization would serve as the foundation
for other reforms, including trade liberaliza-
tion.
Integrating into the
Global Economy:
Trade Liberalization
At the same time as it liberalized its finan-
cial sector, and as part of the third generation
of reforms, El Salvador began a process of
trade liberalization that consisted of the
reduction and elimination of tariff barriers
and the implementation of bilateral trade
agreements with other nations.
El Salvador went from having an average
trade tariff of 23 percent in 198721 to a trade
duty of around 4 percent in 2004—the lowest
in Central America and one of the lowest in all
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of LatinAmerica.Moreover, in 1995, duties on
capital goods and rawmaterials were eliminat-
ed altogether.22 El Salvador has also been one
of the drivers of the process of harmonizing
tariff rules in Central America, which has gen-
erally led to a reduction of trade barriers
throughout the isthmus. By standardizing
trade rules, the nations of Central America
have taken a significant step toward the cre-
ation of a commonmarket for a total popula-
tion of 30 million people, which would make
the region more attractive for foreign direct
investment. In addition, the common market
puts Central America on the road to negotiate
trade agreementswith other nations and trade
blocs that want to negotiate with the region as
awhole.One suchbloc is theEuropeanUnion,
which began tonegotiate an association agree-
ment with Central American countries in the
second half of 2007.
In addition to the Central American
Common Market, which has been in effect
since 1960 as a regional free-trade zone, in
recent years El Salvador has signed bilateral
agreements with Mexico, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Colombia, and Taiwan. It
is currently negotiating an FTA with the 15
members of the Caribbean Community
(Caricom). Negotiations for a trade deal be-
tween Canada, and El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua were suspended
in 2004 at an advanced stage, but are expect-
ed to resume in the future.23
At amultilateral level, El Salvador became a
member of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in 1990 and of its successor, the
World Trade Organization, since the body’s
founding in 1995. Thus, El Salvador has com-
mitted itself to observing the principles gov-
erningworld tradeunderWTOrules, aswell as
related rules that are relevant tomarket access,
investment, services, andmore.
The biggest prize for El Salvador in terms of
trade policy is the free-trade agreement with its
largest trading partner, the United States. By
2007, 50.8 percent of El Salvador’s exports went
to the United States, while 35.6 percent of im-
ports originated from there.24 In 2002, Salva-
doran president Francisco Flores (1999–2004),
at the timepresidentpro temporeof theCentral
American Integration System, proposed to U.S.
president George W. Bush to launch negotia-
tions for a free-trade agreement between the
United States and the five Central American
republics—Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The Dominican
Republic was later added to the agreement,
whichwas then namedDR-CAFTA.
OnDecember 17, 2004, El Salvador became
the first country to ratify DR-CAFTA, which
went into effect on March 1, 2006. Under the
agreement, El Salvador consolidated and
expanded the trade benefits it enjoyed under
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, a unilateral U.S.
concession regime that allows countries in the
Caribbean and Central America to export a
wide range of products duty-free. Even more
importantly, El Salvador has opened up its
market further to American products, which
helps bring down the cost of living formillions
of Salvadorans.
Since the end of El Salvador’s civil war, the
country’s import and export sectorshave expe-
rienced a change that is more qualitative than
quantitative. While exports have grown by a
robust rate of 11.2 percent annually since
1991—the highest long-term export growth
rate inLatinAmerica—themixof export goods
has changed significantly, with a significant
relative decrease in the country’s traditional
exports—such as coffee, sugar, and shrimp—
and a greater share of non-traditional export
products—such as manufactured goods, veg-
etables, and various types of seafood. In 1991,
traditional products accounted for 37.4 per-
cent of El Salvador’s total exports; by 2007
their share of the country’s exports had plum-
meted to 6.5 percent. This trend underscores
the transition to amore competitive economy
based on the production of more value-added
products. Importshave also increased at a sim-
ilar pace (11.5 percent annually during
1991–2007), which shows increased consump-
tion by Salvadorans, thanks to both lower
import tariffs and greater purchasing power.
Trade liberalization yields additional bene-
fits beyond those that can be quantified in
macroeconomic figures. It reduces the power
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of the government—and by extension, the
power of politicians—to decide which eco-
nomic sectors are to be protected through tar-
iff barriers and regulations. It also diminishes
the potential for corruption and favoritism,
since it takes away opportunities for rent-seek-
ing on the part of businessmen looking for
state protection. Trade liberalization thus fos-
ters a healthier relationship between govern-
ment and businesses, one that has tended to
be incestuous in traditionally highly protected
business environments.
Altogether, international trade as a per-
centage of El Salvador’s GDP has risen from
42.1 percent in 1991 to 62.1 percent in 2007,
which represents a significant integration of
the country into the global economy.25 It is
worth noting that this export surge occurred
despite the adoption of the dollar as the coun-
try’s official currency in 2001. In contrast to
other countries in the region where a mercan-
tilist mentality still predominates, El Salvador
did not attempt to promote its exports
through devaluation or any other formof cur-
rencymanipulation. Suchmanipulationnega-
tively affects workers’ incomes and assets by
reducing the purchasing power of their
salaries and pensions.
Regulatory and legal certainty is another
important benefit of trade agreements, and is
an important cause of increased trade and
investment following the finalization of trade
deals.26 The increase in foreign direct invest-
ment in El Salvador provides evidence: the
annual average of foreign direct investment
received by El Salvador in the three years fol-
lowing the ratification of DR-CAFTA is 37.8
percent higher than the annual average in the
three years prior to the treaty’s ratification.
ADollarizationNot
Prompted by Crisis
El Salvador’s greater participation in the
global economy paved the way for another
important reform approved in 2000, this time
in the realm ofmonetary policy. In November
of that year, Salvadoran lawmakers passed the
Monetary Integration Law, which substituted
the Salvadoran colón with the U.S. dollar (at a
fixed exchange rate of 8.75 colones per dollar).
In addition, the law allowed people to enter
into contractual agreements in any foreign
currency in legal circulation.
In contrast to other similar processes, El
Salvador’s dollarization was not carried out
in the midst of a crippling inflationary crisis,
as was the case in Ecuador.27 To the contrary,
the average annual inflation rate during
1996–2000was only 3.36 percent. Rather, the
substitution of the colón for the dollar was
intended to promote growth. Salvadoran
officials were well aware of the role played by
expectations in generating the conditions
necessary for economic development—espe-
cially in the context of Latin America, where
inconsistency in the observance and enforce-
ment of government policies tends to be the
norm. Thus, dollarization sought to accom-
plish four basic objectives:
1. Eliminate the risk of devaluation to
protect the cash value of deposits, pen-
sions, and salaries.
2. Lower interest rates and increase com-
petition in the financial sector.
3. Encourage private investment.
4.Minimize the lack of monetary credibili-
ty, which is common for emerging econ-
omies, through the elimination of inde-
pendentmonetary policy.
The average annual inflation rate has stayed
around 3.9 percent during 2001–2008, even
though in recent years it has experienced an
unusual increase for a dollarized economy (see
Figure 4). Ironically, dollarization may be
responsible for the higher-than-usual inflation,
since themassive influx of family remittances—
comprising 18.1 percent of GDP in 2007—has
increased the amount of money in circulation
in the country, and thus helped push up prices
of consumer goods. Even if the inflationary
effect of remittances can bemitigated by using
those remittances to finance imports, they still
represent an increase in themoney supply that
must be taken into account when analyzing
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inflation rates in El Salvador. The circum-
stancesofElSalvador’seconomymaybeunique
in the world: small, dollarized, and with an
enormous inflow of remittances. Even so, the
Salvadoran economy has been the sixth-least
inflationary in Latin America during
2003–2007,which speaks verywell of the recent
efforts of other Latin American countries to
control inflation.
Regarding the direct effects upon the
economy, banks’ annual average loan interest
rate dropped from 10.8 percent in 2001 to
7.7 percent in 2004, but then rose slightly to
9.4 percent in 2007. Taking into account the
private sector financial liabilities during
2001–2007, the drop in interest rates follow-
ing dollarization represented savings of $2.5
billion in interest payments during the peri-
od—money that was made available for
Salvadoran businesses and families to cover
other expenses.28
Dollarization has also helped to restore
government fiscal discipline, which had been
undermined in the early years of the decade,
in part because of the government’s chal-
lenges in responding to the natural disasters
that battered the country at that time. By the
mid-1990s, credit rating agencies gave El
Salvador one of the highest rankings in Latin
America after Mexico and Chile. Thanks to
dollarization, the public sector non-financial
deficit has been cut from 4.4 percent of GDP
in 2002 to an estimated 0.3 percent in 2007.
From a practical perspective, it is impor-
tant to note that the dollarization transition
process was helped along by the infusion of
billions of dollars each year through remit-
tances from Salvadoran nationals in the
United States to their family members back
in El Salvador. In 2007, remittances reached
$3.7 billion. However, this does not take away
from the fact that dollarization led to the
desired results, and that the country’s resi-
dents today enjoy stability in their cost of liv-
ing thanks to the government’s decision to
give up control over monetary policy.
Figure 4
Average Annual Rate of Inflation 1993–2008
Source: General Office of Statistics and Census, San Salvador.
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Liberalization
and Privatization of
Public Services
To truly appreciate the progress that El
Salvador has made in privatizing and open-
ing its markets in telecommunications, ener-
gy, and hydrocarbons, it is important to rec-
ognize that national infrastructure in these
areas had yet to recover from years of insuffi-
cient investment because of the armed con-
flict. That situation made the participation
of the private sector imperative in order to
overcome this gap.
In 1997, El Salvador’s new telecommunica-
tions law was approved. It opened the telecom
sector to competition and established a regula-
tory framework for telephony and use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. This statute, one of
the most liberal in the world, instituted free
competition in telecoms so that “prices and
terms of service in telecommunications be-
tween operators shall be negotiated freely.”29 In
addition, the law bars suppliers from segment-
ingthemarketamongthemselves, andalsobars
cross-subsidiesof telecomcompanies thatare in
competition with one another. Finally, the
statute introduced strong property rights pro-
tections over the electromagnetic spectrum,
stipulating that every concession for use of the
spectrum is a “private good, being transferable
and open to fragmentation.”30
Salvadoran officials then went further that
same year, when they privatized the National
Telecommunications Administration, ANTEL,
the state telephone company. One of the rea-
sons given for this measure was the unsatisfied
demand andpoor coverage for telecom services
in El Salvador in the years of state monopoly,
when telephone service density was only 8.68
lines per 100 inhabitants. Today, El Salvador’s
telecommunications market enjoys vibrant
competition among 10 land-line telephone ser-
vice providers and4mobile phone firms,which
offer their services directly to consumers.
Competition has allowed the sector to experi-
ence sustained growth, which is reflected in the
number of persons with access to either a land
or mobile telephone line. As Table 1 shows,
therearecurrentlymoretelephonesthanpeople
in El Salvador. By the end of 2007, the country
had 124 telephone lines—including both land
and mobile—per 100 inhabitants. The number
of mobile phone lines has increased by more
than 30,000 percent since 1997.
Market opening was not limited to tele-
coms. It was also extended to other sectors of
the economy, including energy and hydrocar-
bons. For example, in 1996 El Salvador liber-
alized and opened up the electricity market.
The electricity reform also disaggregated the
state energy company into various compa-
nies dedicated to generation, transmission,
and distribution, some of which were sold to
foreign investors. Private investment in elec-
tricity has allowed the rapid development of
geothermal energy, which has enormous
potential in El Salvador because of the coun-
try’s location in an area of high volcanic activ-
ity. In recent years, geothermal energy has
Table 1
Development of Telecommunications in El Salvador, 1997–2007
1997 2007 % of variation
Number of land lines 360,830 1,080,083 199.3%
Land line density* 6.41 18.62 190.4%
Number of mobile lines 20,122 6,137,381 30,400.8%
Mobile phone density* 2.27 105.82 4,561.7%
General phone density* 8.68 124.44 1,333.0%
* Number of users per 100 persons.
Source: Superintendent’s Office of Telecommunications of El Salvador.
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come to comprise over a fourth of the coun-
try’s total electrical generation.
With hydrocarbons, El Salvador went from
a completely regulated market in 1992 to one
in which the government limits itself to moni-
toring consumer prices on a weekly basis, with
theaimof informingconsumersabout thebest
prices available at the country’s filling stations.
The government does not import or refine
fuels, and it does not regulate consumer prices
in any way. Growing competition in recent
years has allowed the emergence of indepen-
dent service stations—thanks to the simplifica-
tion in the licensing process for station opera-
tors—which has helped reduce the cost
margins accumulated throughout the oil-sup-
ply chain.According to a2005 studyby theUN
Economic Commission for Latin America, in
the three yearsprior to the study thosemargins
had come down in El Salvador from 40 U.S.
cents to 34 U.S. cents per gallon, while other
countries in the region that hadhighly regulat-
edmarkets, such as Costa Rica andHonduras,
had seen those margins rise.31 Thus, it should
not be surprising that by November 2008, El
Salvador had the lowest fuel prices in Central
America (see Table 2).
By opening such strategic sectors as tele-
communications, energy, and hydrocarbons to
competition and private investment, El Salva-
dor helped to ensure the provision of modern,
efficient, and competitive services in areas on
which the entire economydepends. In contrast
withMexico, where state and privatemonopo-
lies predominate, El Salvador does not suffer
from supply bottlenecks in the provision of
these goods. Moreover, the government made
the right decision in transferring the responsi-
bility to build, upgrade, and maintain infra-
structure in these areas to the private sector—
doing otherwise would have imposed a
significant burden on state finances. Salva-
doranofficialswisely applied themaxim that if
the private sector can provide a good or service
andcandosobetter thanthegovernment, then
there is no reason for the state to become
involved in providing that same good or ser-
vice. Moreover, unlike privatizations carried
out in other Latin American countries such as
Argentina and Mexico, El Salvador’s privatiza-
tion process generally has been characterized
by its transparency. Reforms in El Salvador
havenotgiven rise to eitherprivatemonopolies
or captivemarkets, andno corruption scandals
implicating anyone involved in the process
have come to light. This transparency is one of
the most important features that lend legiti-
macy to the Salvadoran market reforms that
were begun in the 1990s.
Fiscal Policy: Responsibility
without Creativity
Despite an onslaught of natural disasters,
including two earthquakes in 2001 and
Hurricane Stan in 2005, El Salvador’s gov-
ernment has managed to maintain the fiscal
Table 2
Prices of Gasoline and Diesel to End Consumers in Central America, November 14, 2008
($U.S. per gallon)
Gasoline
Country Premium Regular Diesel
Guatemala 3.48 3.35 3.35
Honduras 3.20 3.00 3.12
Nicaragua 3.35 3.23 3.29
Costa Rica 4.65 4.50 4.12
El Salvador 2.95 2.72 3.03
Source: Ministry of Economy of El Salvador.
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discipline that has characterized its perfor-
mance since the late 1980s. The national gov-
ernment reduced its fiscal deficit from 3.1
percent of GDP in 2002 to 0.5 percent of
GDP in 2007, allowing El Salvador to enjoy,
after Chile andMexico, one of the best sover-
eign risk grades in Latin America byMoody’s
and Standard and Poor’s rating agencies.
Deficit reduction has been made possible by
a small decline in government spending—
which went from 15.6 percent of GDP in
2002 to 15.4 percent of GDP in 2007—and an
increase in tax revenues, from 12.5 percent of
GDP in 2002 to 14.9 percent in 2007 (see
Figure 5).
However, the low tax burden—that is, tax
revenues as a percentage of GDP—should not
be interpreted as indicating that El Salvador
is a fiscal paradise with uniquely attractive
tax rates. On the contrary, El Salvador’s tax
rates are similar to those of other countries in
the region. For example, the top corporate
and individual income tax rates both stand at
25 percent—both close to the Latin American
average. The value-added tax stands at 13
percent and, as in the rest of Latin America, is
the main source of government tax revenue,
accounting for 53.8 percent of overall rev-
enue in 2007.32 Nevertheless, compared to
other countries in the region, El Salvador has
few taxes. In addition to income taxes and the
VAT, the country has only two direct con-
sumption taxes (on alcohol and tobacco),
import taxes (among the lowest in Latin
America), and a 3 percent duty on real estate
transactions above $250,000.
There is still room for improvement in El
Salvador’s tax policy. A World Bank report,
Paying Taxes, not only ranks the tax rates
among 178 countries, but rates the ease of
paying taxes—that is, the amount of transac-
tions that a business must carry out to pay
taxes, as well as the number of hours dedicat-
ed to paying taxes. In this area, El Salvador
performs poorly—ranking 101st in the world.
The country gets poor grades in the number
of payments (66) and in the number of hours
required to pay taxes (224).33
Unfortunately, Salvadoran fiscal policy
has not been subject to innovative measures
to enhance the country’s competitiveness. El
Salvador could increase its attractiveness to
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Figure 5
Tax Revenues, Government Spending, and Deficit as a Share of GDP, 2002–2007
Source: Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, San Salvador.
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investors—both local and foreign—as well as
improve its fiscal situation by adopting a low
flat tax, which would reduce current corpo-
rate tax rates and minimize the tax system’s
complexity—and thus reduce incentives for
tax avoidance and tax evasion. To this end, El
Salvador could learn from the experiences of
Eastern European countries that have adopt-
ed flat-tax systems over the past decade.34 A
fiscal policy based on simple and low taxes
would be the perfect complement to the
reforms already realized in other areas of the
Salvadoran economy.
Development without
Growth?
Economic theory andpracticeboth suggest
that implementing the public policies indicat-
ed above will generate growth rates that in the
medium- to long-term will foster economic
development and reduce poverty. Without
high growth rates, there can be no rapid devel-
opment.35 However, El Salvador seems to be a
case of development without significant
growth. Since the end of the civil war in 1992,
per capita GDPhas grown by an unimpressive
1.9 percent annually. Apart fromabrief period
during the 1990s (1992–1995)when it grewby
an average of 4.5 percent per year, El Salvador’s
per capita GDP has not grown significantly
despite the country’s economic reforms. It was
not until 2007 that the country’s per capita
GDP achieved the purchasing power parity
income level it had in 1978, the year before the
start of the civil war (see Figure 6). This situa-
tion has vexed economists. Harvard Universi-
ty’s Dani Rodrik describes the situation as
“puzzling,” andnotes, “El Salvador looks like a
country with very good institutions for its low
level of income.”36
How can a country reduce the percentage
of households below the poverty line by near-
2000
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Figure 6
Official per Capita GDP, 1978–2007 (constant 2005 $U.S., Purchasing Power Parity)
Source: World Bank,World Development Indicators, Washington.
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ly half with such a meager per capita growth
rate? Could it be that El Salvador has not in
fact developed and that the marked improve-
ments in the country’s social indicators are
the result of the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars that Salvadorans receive in remittances
year after year as suggested by some non-
governmental organizations?37
One reason for this disparity between indi-
cators lies in the poor quality of the data on
which they are based. For example, the coun-
try’s most recent census results, published in
May 2008, revealed that El Salvador had 1.4
million fewer people than originally projected.
This change in population figures alone sub-
stantially alters the country’s per capita GDP
numbers, among other figures. An estimate
based on the new census figures shows that by
2007, per capita GDP would be 17 percent
higher than the official figure (see Figure 7).
Therefore, according to the revised popu-
lation data, El Salvador’s per capita GDP has
grown by 3.3 percent since 1992—the third-
highest rate in Latin America during this
period, after the Dominican Republic (3.8
percent) and Chile (3.6 percent).38 Even so,
such a rate is not characteristic of a “tiger”
economy, especially one that has experienced
both deep economic reforms and marked
social improvements.
El Salvador’s low-growth figures may be a
result of the way the country collects eco-
nomic data. According toManuel Hinds, for-
mer Salvadoran finance minister and archi-
tect of the country’s dollarization process,
there is good reason to believe that the coun-
try’s data underestimates the economic
growth rate. Hinds notes that throughout El
Salvador there are many visible signs, such as
more highways, telephone lines, and shop-
ping centers, which suggest that the country
has grown at a faster rate than the official fig-
ures indicate. For example, between 2000 and
2005, manufacturing in El Salvador grew
more rapidly than in any other country in
Latin America. A growth rate below 2 percent
is incongruous for a national economy
exhibiting such dynamism.
Hinds contends that the problem lies in
the services sector being undervalued in the
3000
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Figure 7
Per capita GDP, 1992–2007 (constant 2005 $U.S., Purchasing Power Parity)
Sources: World Bank,World Development Indicators, Washington; and Manuel Hinds, May 2008.
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country’s estimation of GDP:
How can an error in national econom-
ic data come about? Very easy. Such
data are derived from a sample of prod-
ucts that are considered representative
of each sector. This sample is designed
from a detailed economic census that
provides twokinds of information. The
first is a detailed estimate of produc-
tion during the year surveyed. The sec-
ond is a sample of products that com-
prise the majority of each sector, so
that in subsequent years such produc-
tion may be estimated by measuring
only these dominant products. If these
grow, the entire sector is considered to
grow, and vice versa. The problem is
that if the economy is changing in its
fundamental makeup—new economic
activities emerge as others recede—this
method will tend to underestimate
actual production. The loss of produc-
tion in the declining sectors will be
included in the estimate, while the
gains in the new emerging sectors will
not. The base survey currently used in
El Salvador was developed in 1992, in
an economy totally different from that
of today. Underestimates are very likely
when a long time has passed and the
economy has changed so much.39
This anomaly is especially evident in the
services sector: as demand for services increas-
es because of increases in consumption and
investment, the supply of services should be
expected to grow in nearly proportional fash-
ion. However, Hinds finds that the country’s
economic data indicate not only that the sup-
ply of services is not growing at a pace consis-
tent with the demand for them, but that the
capacity of supply to meet demand during
1995–2005 was the lowest during the last 40
years—including during the civil war.40 In
addition to Hinds’ analysis, the marked devel-
opment of sectors like telecommunications
over the past decade—thanks to liberalization
and privatization—makes the official growth
figures even harder to take seriously. For
example, during 1998–2007, investment in
services averaged 67.7 percent of annual for-
eign direct investment in El Salvador.41
But if the official figures are in error, as
seems likely, is there a way to estimate El
Salvador’s true growth rate? Hinds attempts
this by calculating the supply of services dur-
ing 1989–2006 with the same response
capacity that those in-demand services had
during 1960–1988. Substituting official fig-
ures with these revised numbers, Hinds con-
cludes that El Salvador’s GDP in 2006 was
36.7 percent higher than official figures indi-
cate (see Figure 8). In addition, he estimates
the average annual growth rate during
1989–2006 at 5.7 percent, rather than the
official figure of 2.1 percent. It is worth not-
ing that Hinds starts from the assumption
that the supply of services during 1989–2006
showed the same average capacity to respond
to demand as during 1960–1988.However, as
already noted, it is safe to assume that the ser-
vices sector experienced even greater growth
because of increased competition and private
investment since the 1990s.
Hinds’ thesis appears to be borne out by a
long-termgrowth estimate in theWorldBank’s
2003 Country Economic Memorandum for El
Salvador, which indicates that given the condi-
tions during the period of 1996–1999, the
country’s expected annual growth rate during
that time should have been 6.2 percent.42
Moreover, an InternationalMonetaryFunddel-
egation that visited the country in 2005 recom-
mended to the local authorities that they revise
the formula for calculating GDP. According to
press reports, the IMF“believes that the scheme
for calculating GDP is not congruent with the
new economy based on services, an area in
which it considers El Salvador the leader in the
region. Yet calculations are stillmade according
to an agriculture-basedmodel.”43
Taking into account Hinds’ estimates and
the revised population data, El Salvador’s
annual per capita growth rate between 1992
and 2007 stands at approximately 5.2 per-
cent, a markedly higher figure than the offi-
cial estimate of 1.9 percent per year.
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Despite uncertainty over El Salvador’s true
growth rate over the past decade, the case for
it being notably higher than official figures
indicate is compelling and is supported by
international observers. El Salvador’s signifi-
cant advances in poverty reduction and in
human development indicators are hardly
characteristic of the laggard economy sug-
gested by the official figures.
Other Possible Causes of
El Salvador’s Development
While theremaybe roomfordebate regard-
ing the Salvadoran economy’s true growth
rate, there is little room for disagreement re-
garding the substantial improvements in citi-
zens’ quality of life, as social indicators show.
There remains some uncertainty, however,
over whether these social improvements are
duemore to the economic reforms or to other
phenomena, such as the end of the civil con-
flict or family remittances from Salvadorans
living outside the country.
Peace:Without a doubt, securing peace has
contributed to economic growth, as would be
the case in any country that experiencedmore
than a decade of civil war. The fact that the
Salvadoran economy’s healthy growth rates
during the brief period following the end of
the war (4.5 percent per year during 1992–
1995) later slowed down appears to suggest
that the return of peace does in fact help
explain the economy’s improved performance.
However, other countries in the region that
also underwent peace processes and democra-
tization, such as Nicaragua and Guatemala,
have not seen poverty level reductions similar
to that in El Salvador.44 Further, the quality
and prices for services in El Salvador following
privatization are in greatmeasuremore attrac-
tive than in other countries, such as Costa
Rica, which has enjoyed peace and stability for
Figure 8
El Salvador GDP 1989–2006, Estimated and Official Figures (constant 2000 $U.S.)
Source:Manuel Hinds, “¿Cuánto estamos creciendo? Compensando la Inconsistencia,” El Diario de Hoy (El Salvador),
June 10, 2005. (Updated by Hinds in May 2008.)
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over 60 years, butwhichuntil recently adhered
to a mixed economy model characterized by
inefficient state monopolies in telecommuni-
cations, insurance, hydrocarbons, and other
industries.
El Salvador would never have been able to
launch its economic liberalization process
had it remained engulfed in a crippling civil
war. Therefore, the role that peace has played
in the country’s economic transformation
should not be neglected, but it alone does not
explain the socioeconomic achievements of
the last decade and a half.
Family remittances: In 2007, El Salvador
received $3.7 billion in remittances, whichwas
around 18.1 percent of the country’s GDP.No
doubt that such a large inflow of money
would greatly impact the country’s economy
and the quality of life of its residents. But are
remittances the reason for El Salvador’s
marked improvement in its social indicators in
the last 17 years? If that were the case, other
countries in the region that have also received
large cash inflows through remittances—such
as Haiti (29 percent of GDP), Nicaragua (18
percent), and Jamaica (17 percent)45—would
have enjoyed similar reductions in poverty lev-
els. Yet such is not the case, and the reasons are
obvious: an influx ofmoneywill help promote
growth and reduce poverty if the country
enjoys a favorable economic climate. Thus,
remittances may well have contributed to El
Salvador’s economic development, but that is
because themarket reformsof recent years cre-
ated the conditions for growth.
What effect do remittances have on poverty
reduction? According to a study by the UN
Economic Commission for Latin America,
remittances to El Salvador helped reduce
poverty by 4.5 percent. That is a notable figure,
but not enough to explain the reduction by
nearly 25 percentage points in the number of
households below the poverty line that was
achieved between 1991 and 2007. The study
also notes that “the repercussions of remit-
tances upon poverty among the entire popula-
tion are of little significance.”46 In 2006, a
World Bank report analyzed the impact of
remittances among 11 Latin American coun-
tries, and found that inEl Salvador theyhelped
reduce poverty by 5.1 percentage points.47
The role of remittances in improving the
recipients’ quality of life shouldnot beunderes-
timated, especially in satisfying short-term
necessities for households that, in most cases,
face significant economic limitations.However,
if remittances are playing an increasingly
important role in reducing poverty in El
Salvador, it is because an increasingly dynamic
economy allows it.
The Threat of Violence
Despite El Salvador’s favorable outlook
resulting from its commitment to economic
liberalization and integration into the world
economy, there is another challenge thatmust
be met if that country is to aspire to a good
standard of living: citizens’ security. Ironically,
the main catalyst for the climate of violence
that currently besets the country is a problem
that has been imported from the United
States—juvenile gangs, known asmaras.48
Today, El Salvador is the most violent
country in theworld. In 2007, therewere 3,491
murders, and the countryhadamurder rate of
60.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.49 Gang violence
is the main culprit behind these alarming fig-
ures. According to official figures, there are
10,000 gang members in El Salvador, and
gangs are responsible for around 60percent of
all murders.
This lack of basic security imposes enor-
mous costs on the Salvadoran economy and
scares away investment. According to a study
by El Salvador’s National Public Security
Council, the violence cost the country $2 bil-
lion in2006—nearly 11percent ofGDP.50 That
is a tremendous loss for a country trying to
take off both economically and in terms of
social indicators.
The failure of theARENAadministrations
to address the lack of security in the country
has helped to erode support for the party.
Security under the rule of law is an essential
component of a liberal policy agenda.
Declining support for the ruling party is
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understandable since security is a key ingre-
dient of an individual’s well-being and a basic
notion of justice.
By imposing a significant burden on the
economy and by creating popular discontent,
high levels of violence represent the greatest
threat to sustained growth and liberal policies
in El Salvador. Unfortunately, there are no sil-
ver bullets to deal with the violence, especially
when youth gangs—with their complex socio-
logical background—have played such a
prominent role as one of themain culprits.
Conclusion
The serious problem that civil violence rep-
resents in no way diminishes the important
strides that El Salvador has made over the last
decade and a half. In Latin America, which
even today finds itself locked in a struggle
between fragile democracies and a centuries-
old authoritarian populist tradition, this
country presents a serious challenge to those
who question whether economic liberty can
set firm roots in the region.
The road ahead probably will not be easy.
While El Salvadorhas indeedmade a successful
transition to peace and democracy, with the
Marxist FMLN abandoning armed struggle in
favor of electoral politics and becoming the
country’s main opposition party, it remains to
be seen whether it has truly left behind its
Marxist-Leninist ideology and close ties with
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in favor of
a modern center-left course along the lines of
Chile’s Concertación Nacional. The death of
Shafik Handal in 2006, the FMLN’s iconic
leader, opened the door to such a transforma-
tion—on which depends the future of Salva-
dorandemocracy.However, the FMLN’s ortho-
dox Marxist rhetoric has survived intact as the
country heads into a presidential election this
March,51 which the FMLNhas a serious chance
of winning.52
Much remains to be done, especially at the
micro level. One of the biggest failings of the
reforms implemented during the 1990s
throughout Latin America was to neglect the
implementation of measures that could have
allowed themajority of the populace to enjoy
the benefits of an open economy. If, for a
majority of the people, increased access to
property is not realized, and access to the
market economy is blocked through a web of
regulations and restrictions, discontent will
grow andwill sooner or later bemanifested at
the ballot box. If globalization has helped
exacerbate social inequality in Latin America,
it has been largely because the states allow
only a select group to participate in that
process while the door remains closed to a
much larger number. To increase opportuni-
ties for the poor, it is necessary to promote
property titling among the most disadvan-
taged sectors of society and to eliminate reg-
ulations and restrictions that prevent the
establishment of formal enterprises.53
On that point, El Salvador still has a long
way to go. According to the World Bank’s
Doing Business 2009 report, starting a business
in that country requires eight bureaucratic
transactions that take a total of approximate-
ly 17 days to complete. The cost of starting a
business in El Salvador thus represents 49.6
percent of per capita income. By contrast, in
Canada, starting a business requires only 1
procedure that takes 5 days, at a cost of 0.5
percent of per capita income. In El Salvador,
fulfilling all permit and licensing require-
ments for a new building requires 34 transac-
tions, takes 155 days, and costs 176 percent of
per capita income. In New Zealand, a similar
undertakingwould require 7 transactions that
take 65 days to complete, and costs 25.8 per-
cent of per capita income.54 El Salvador has
made significant strides in some of the areas
measured in thisWorldBank index,55 butwith
such significant bureaucratic obstacles, it is
not surprising that 40 percent of the econom-
ically active population works in the informal
sector.56 For El Salvador’s reforms to reach a
greater potential, it is imperative for Salva-
doran officials to reduce the costs of doing
business.
There are many challenges ahead, and it
will be a long time before El Salvador will join
the ranks of developed countries. Yet El
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Salvador is showing the world that, despite
difficult conditions and a tumultuous past,
the road todevelopment and abetter standard
of living is openedby economic liberty and the
opportunities created by globalization.
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